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Abstract
As observed in the financial crisis, CDS spreads tend to increase simutaneously as
a reaction to common shocks. Focusing on the spillover effects triggered by extreme
events, we propose a credit risk analysis tool by applying credit default swap spread
returns to the concept of 4CoVaR suggested by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011).
The interconnection and mutual impact on credit spreads are investigated based on
CDS spreads of the biggest derivative dealers in the market. By including factors
identified as determinants of CDS spreads to the set of explanatory variables such as
equity return and equity volatility and implementing the variable selection technique
least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO), the results demonstrate an
improved performance in CDS spread VaR calculation. The enhancement is more
significant in pre-crisis period but both methodologies tend to overestimate risk in
turbulent period. Further, non-linear effects between CDS spreads in extreme events
are captured by the introduction of a partial linear model in the CoVaR calculation.
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Nowaday derivatives are standard elements of the financial market and cover a wide
variety of products. There are listed derivatives such as exchange traded futures and
options but also over-the-counter (OTC) products such as forwards or swaps traded
bilaterally by financial institutions, fund managers, and corporate treasurers. The flex-
ibility of OTC derivatives in the area of hedging and risk management, price discovery
and enhancement of liquidity is one of the reasons for the fast growth of these prod-
ucts in the market (Acharya et al. (2009)). Since the financial crisis unfolded several
vulnerabilities in OTC trading (lack of transparency, interconnectedness and change in
counterparty credit risk) regulators advocate for the clearing of OTC derivative trans-
actions through central counterparties. This has been legally established in the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 for the United States
of America (SEC (2010)) and regulatory adopted by the European Parliament and The
Council (ESMA (2013)). The Basel Committee supports this attempt by offering in-
centives for centrally cleared OTC derivative transactions through counterparty credit
risk reforms under Basel III framework (BIS (2011)). The main objective of these acts
are to centrally control the counterparty credit risk of those trades and to anticipate
systemic risk mitigation. This regulation is facing two main challenges. One is the
implementation of standardized contractual terms and operational processes. A legal
standardisation is important for netting and effective risk management whereas opera-
tional standardisation of trade terms is vital for setting initial and variation margins.
The second challenge is an appropriate counterparty credit risk allocation for an ade-
quate risk controlling. A mapping of risk contribution to individual counterparties has
two main enhancements. Firstly, it provides further information how the default or dis-
tress of one bank impacts the system. Secondly, it reduces the incentive for risk-seeking
behavior and fosters effective risk monitoring.
The recent financial crisis and its aftermath disclose the boost in interconnectedness
within financial market participants. High correlation among financial firms can usually
be explained by simultaneous response to common risk factors. Moreover, in stressed
period market participants are engaged progressively in ”flight to quality” when market
participants are forced to reduce risk and invest in securities with good credit ratings.
Further, the increased trading of derivatives contributes to the high sensitivity to coun-
terparty credit risk in the financial industry. Thus, mutual impacts play an important
role within the system. As a consequence, monitoring of individual risk is not suffi-
cient and systemic risk contribution needs to be considered. The interconnection and
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externality effects of financial institutions have already been examined by Acharya et al.
(2010), Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), Hautsch et al. (2013), Brownlees and En-
gle (2010) or Düllmann and Sosinska (2007), Upper and Worm (2004) with focus on
the German banking sector. Further, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in-
cluded supplementary methodology in December 2011 to identify systemically important
banks (Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs)). The assessment methodology is
based on five categories: size, interconnectedness, substituability, cross-border activity,
and complexity of the bank.
In this paper we propose a macro-prudential view from a central counterparty’s
perspective. This research is focused on the measurement of spillover effects of credit
risk by using credit default swaps spreads as a proxy for credit risk. The scope of our
work is the analysis of counterparty credit risk effects of a distressed counterparty on
other market members. This requires the study of ’tail events’ given that one of the
market participants is in stress. Quantitatively speaking this falls into the category of
VaR (value at risk) and more precisely conditional value at risk. Therefore, we employ
CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). It denotes the maximum loss in time t+ d
which will only be exceeded under a confidence level of τ , where 0 < τ < 1. This measure
is expressed statistically by the τ -quantile of the conditional distribution of returns
VaRτt+d = inf {x ∈ R : P(Xt+d ≤ x | Ft) ≥ τ} , (1)
where Ft is the information set up to time t.
The CoVaR is defined as the VaR of an institution j conditional on an event of
institution i denoted by C(Xi).
Pr
{
Xj ≤ CoVaRj|C(Xi)τ | C(Xi)
}
= τ. (2)
Subsequently, the systemic contribution of each institution is determined by the delta
CoVaR (4CoVaR) level conditional on the median state of the institution and the status
where the institution is under distress




This quantity exhibits the marginal contribution of individual financial institutions to
the remainder within the system. The benefit in applying 4CoVaR measure is versatile.
The main advantage lies in its ability to reflect the effect of the distress of one individual
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institution on another firm based on the stand-alone risk level. In addition, 4CoVaR
is effective for the identification of systemically relevant counterparties. This measure
reflects the concept of the ”stressed VaR” proposed by Basel Committee to supplement
the VaR framework - a risk measure of stand-alone risk under extreme and volatile mar-
ket conditions.
In order to capture credit risk properly we add further variables which are identi-
fied to have major impact on CDS spreads including variables at firm level. Since this
inclusion greatly inflates the number of variables, multicollinearity or strong correlation
between covariates might cause inadequate error in the estimation results of the regres-
sion. Therefore, we apply least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) as a
simple variable selection technique to overcome this problem. As the proposed method
generates less exceedance in backtesting our method improves the performance in the
VaR prediction in comparison to the earlier methodology.
Corresponding to Espinosa et al. (2013) we discover that the most relevant coeffi-
cients for CDS spreads VaR are the VIX and the liquidity spread. The LASSO technique
reveals that CDS spread returns can be mostly solely described by the covariate VIX.
This could result from the fact that market volatility have a high impact on the remain-
ing variables as the CDS spread returns are described by more coefficients when VIX is
excluded from the set of explanatory variables. In contrast to Breitenfellner and Wagner
(2012) we find a predominant negative influence of stock market volatitlity on spread
changes relative to stock market return. The influence increases during the crisis. This
result goes along with the findings from Alexander and Kaeck (2008) for crisis period.
The 4CoVaR from our research reveals that the effect of distress varies between banks
and there are institutions which have a higher effects on their counterparties and there-
fore can be considered as more systemic relevant than others.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the
structure and risk management of a central counterparty. Section 2 provides a short
discussion about the application of CDS spreads in credit risk predictions. Thereafter,
the methodology is introduced and data are described. An empirical anaylsis is given in
section 5. Section 6 concludes and presents further remarks.
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2. Concept of Central Counterparty
The OTC derivatives market is facing many changes. One of these major changes
is the mandatory clearing of standardized OTC derivatives via central clearing counter-
party (CCP). Standardized OTC derivatives offer pre-determined terms in legal and op-
erational specifications which are provided by the ISDA master agreement ISDA (2013).
A CCP can be seen as a counterparty which interposes itself between the initial counter-
parties of the derivative contract and takes the position as a seller to the original buyer
and the position of a buyer to the original seller. The original bilateral relationship
between the counterparties is then withdrawn. The main benefit of this new structure
lies in the reduction of the total exposure. In the example shown in figure 1, the total
exposure amounts to 760 without netting. The total exposure is reduced from 760 to
420 in case netting effects are taken into account. Herein, the long and short position
between two counterparties are offset. Multilateral netting further reduces the total ex-
posure of the trades from 420 to 180. It is important to note that the exposure reduces
or increases when there are more than one CCPs which clear different classes of OTC
derivatives (Duffie et al. (2010), Duffie and Zhu (2011), Cont and Kokholm (2013)).
Due to the replacement of the original contract by two new contracts, the posi-
tions with opposite direction are automatically offset and CCP barely faces less market
risk. However, the CCP internalizes counterparty credit risk from its clearing members.
When a counterparty defaults, the CCP has to unwind the defaulted position. In case
replacement costs exceed the deposit collateral the remaining losses are then mutualized
to their clearing members.
Figure 1: Market structure of OTC derivatives market with and without central clearing
counterparty
Currently, CCPs rely on different risk management mechanism such as stringent
membership access, initial margin, variation margin and default fund contribution. Ini-
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tial margins are deposits required by opening new position and cover the extreme changes
of potential future exposures whereas variation margin is needed to cover daily changes
in mark-to-market value. Default fund contribution is an additional deposit where each
clearing member has to contribute. It represents further buffer in case the occurred losses
exceed the variation and initial margins. However, there still exists a lack of standard in
the risk management mechanism of a CCP (Duffie et al. (2010)). There is a necessity in a
distinct credit risk mapping in the calculation of the default fund contribution based on
the severeness of the spillover effects. As the default fund covers the loss from extreme
events, there is a need to find a stressed risk measure reflecting severe changes in the
credit spreads. Default funds’ relevant losses occur when a counterparty defaults and
losses are not fully covered by deposit collateral. Further, a CCP needs to consider the
mark-to-market changes of derivative trades initiated by distressed derivative dealers.
An application of our work is the identification of credit risk contribution of individual
clearing members to the central clearing counterparty (CCP).
To understand the challenges a CCP faces in the real world, we refer to the insur-
ance corporation American International Group (AIG) as an example. This monoline
was struggling from significant losses in securities lending businesses, mark-to-market
losses on CDS and associated margin calls as a consequence of excessive CDS selling.
Due to lack in liquidity and downgrade by the major rating agencies, AIG could not
fulfill all collateral requirements. In order to avoid spill-over effects caused by AIG’s
bankruptcy, the company was bailed out by the US government. AIG is an example
worth mentioning because it could not fullfil the collateral requirements resulting from
mark-to-market changes in derivatives among other circumstances. As a consequence,
the question arises whether a central counterparty can prevent financial market partici-
pants from such excessive CDS selling and manage the risks implied by distressed market
environment? By offering clearing and settlement procedures, the CCP would be highly
sensitive to counterparty credit risk due to changes in market value and therefore de-
pends on accurate future exposure simulation methods. Therefore, the central clearing
counterparty should put emphasis on the identification of risks triggered by default of a
clearing member and take precautionary measures.
Further discussion of the structure and the risk of central counterparty is to be found
in Pirrong (2011). Economical analysis on the reduction of counterparty credit risk by
introducing a unique CCP is given in Duffie and Zhu (2011). Duffie and Zhu show that
counterparty credit risk can diminish in case there is an unique existing CCP but also
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point out that multiple CCP might decrease netting opportunities and increase risk.
Arora et al. (2012) support and complement the results provided by Duffie and Zhu
(2011).
3. Data
3.1. Credit Default Swaps Spread and its determinants
Until recently, many papers have been published referring to the evaluation of coun-
terparty risk by using CDS spreads as a proxi for credit risk. A credit default swap
(CDS) is an insurance contract on debt of a reference entity. The buyer of the CDS
receives a payment in case the reference entity defaults and makes a fixed payment (usu-
ally quarterly) to the CDS seller as long as default has not been occurred. The spread
on the reference entity is expressed as a fair premium based on the expected loss given
default and the probability default.
Towards credit risk assessment by rating, CDS spreads are more benificial as they
are traded market indicators for credit risk and react quickly to market events. Further,
they directly reflect the market’s perception of credit risk (Longstaff et al. (2007)) and
express the implied price of risk on the reference entity to a certain extent. This is
illustrated by the soaring CDS spread of AIG during the financial crisis in 2. Another
example is Bear Stearns which was in financial distress from mid February until mid
March in 2008. In mid February, the spread of a CDS on Bear Stearns’ senior unsecured
debt with 5 year maturity was located at 100 basis points. In mid March, it rose to
almost 250 basis points. When the crisis by Bear Stearns was solved through its sale to
JP Morgan Chase arranged by the Fed, the spreads reverted within a month to its mid-
February levels. This example taken from Acharya and Subrahmanyam (2008) shows
the impacts of distress and new information on CDS spreads movements. In addition,
it also reveals the relevant impact of liquidity risk. The scarcity of CDS seller could
also lead to high CDS spreads which automatically increases the concentration on the
market. CDS spreads not only reflect the credit risk of the underlying entity, but also
include the credit risk of the counterparty providing the protection.
Our research raises the question how to forecast CDS spreads and how to quantify
the effect of correlation within a portfolio of CDS. By using the macro variables observed
in the market, we are able to analyse the effect of market development on the change
of CDS spreads for individual counterparty. It is obvious that counterparties which
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Figure 2: AIG bid-ask level
show high systemic importance and high dependence to market movements in its CDS
spread should meet higher capital requirements than others, which is also applied by
the standard regulatory tools such as supervision and risk-based capital requirements in
Duffie (2010). Since the group of derivative dealers and especially CDS dealers is small,
it increases the interconnectedness on the dealer market and could lead to a rise in re-
placement costs in case a dealer defaults and other market participants have to amend
the derivative trade. Therefore, CoVaR would not only give an credit risk overview of
one counterparties to the remaining counterparty of the portfolio. Furthermore, it also
provides the basis for the overall credit risk effect on replacement cost of a derivative
contract. This effect is illustrated in the high bid-ask spreads of CDS derivatives and
IRS during and after the financial crisis of the distressed firm. The credit risk from
financial institutions are not only determined by their fundametals but also affected by
spillover effects created by the condition of the macroeconomics and conditions of other
system relevant financial institutions on the market.
3.2. Data selection
The CDS data are obtained from Bloomberg and cover the period from September
12, 2002 to December 31, 2011. The data set is divided into two periods which are
considered as pre-crisis and crisis. The shock event is marked by the default of Lehman
on September 16, 2008. CDS spreads of fourteen biggest derivative dealers in the market
are included, which contain Bank of America (BoA), Barclays (BARC), BNP Paribas
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(BNP), Citigroup (Citi), Credit Suisse (CS), Deutsche Bank (DB), Goldman Sachs (GS),
HSBC (HSBC), J.P. Morgan (JPM), Morgan Stanley (MS), Royal Bank of Schottland
(RBS), Société Générale (SG), UBS, and Lehman Brothers. In addition, we add the
monoline AIG to the variable set to capture extreme high spread development. Until
the shock event in 2008, the majority of the financial institutions receive an AA rating
from Standard and Poor’s (S&P). However, the CDS spreads show significant movement
after Lehman’s default in September 2008. At the end of 2008 and the beginning of
2009, AA-rated banks were downgraded to A level except for Barclays, BNP and HSBC.
In the late post shock period, all financial institutions are rated on an A level by S&P.
The overall sample contains 2208 observations for all institutions except for Lehman and
a descriptive statistic overview of CDS spread level and CDS spread log returns is given
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Figure 3: CDS spreads of the representative 5 global financial institutions and one global
insurance company
As CDS spread determinants we considered in total 37 independent variables. The
panel data covers 7 state variables suggested by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). It
includes the VIX for implied volatility of the stock market reported by Chicago Board
Options Exchange. The short term liquidity spread which is measured by the differ-
ence between the three-month repo rate and three-month bill rate. The change in the
three-month Treasury bill rate from the Federal Reserve Board is also included as its
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of CDS spreads in basis point
Mean Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis Min Median Max Autocorr
CITI 104,795 121,726 1,748 3,498 7,438 34,709 665,532 0,996
BOA 87,620 95,516 1,586 2,397 8,003 32,167 483,064 0,997
BARCLAYS 65,094 68,200 0,991 -0,066 5,594 23,209 278,637 0,997
BNP 50,618 59,424 2,168 5,560 5,375 23,268 359,586 0,997
CS 62,647 52,799 0,978 0,215 8,397 45,509 263,295 0,996
DB 59,720 53,089 1,087 0,762 9,550 38,035 311,601 0,996
GS 95,775 89,719 1,561 2,116 18,750 53,750 545,143 0,993
HSBC 45,008 41,161 0,996 0,114 4,937 25,000 183,530 0,997
JPM 61,303 43,124 0,979 0,291 11,450 46,492 232,301 0,995
MS 123,375 138,067 2,521 10,767 17,833 55,488 1239,997 0,984
RBS 83,709 94,375 1,124 0,474 3,964 23,750 395,937 0,998
SG 64,678 78,502 2,124 5,274 5,964 24,317 440,265 0,997
UBS 63,464 70,687 1,316 1,337 4,500 21,125 361,675 0,997
LEHMAN 59,429 71,726 3,411 13,356 18,821 34,402 641,911 0,991
AIG 279,207 500,674 3,096 11,119 8,156 42,667 3758,987 0,992
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of CDS spread log returns. Mean and median of CDS
spread returns of all financial institution are almost at zero and therefore are not shown
in the table.
Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Autocorr.
CITI 0.023 0.871 27.203 -0.174 0.286 0.032
BOA 0.023 0.579 14.454 -0.182 0.247 0.008
BARCLAYS 0.021 1.045 24.028 -0.155 0.270 0.115
BNP 0.021 0.160 17.017 -0.192 0.214 0.117
CS 0.019 0.172 17.983 -0.168 0.182 0.065
DB 0.020 0.682 22.554 -0.156 0.252 0.143
GS 0.020 -0.040 28.865 -0.248 0.219 0.222
HSBC 0.019 -0.294 13.582 -0.147 0.151 0.067
JPM 0.019 0.453 15.169 -0.138 0.213 0.117
MS 0.023 4.678 118.434 -0.255 0.475 -0.006
RBS 0.024 1.884 87.755 -0.368 0.376 -0.072
SG 0.020 -0.209 21.404 -0.223 0.187 0.129
UBS 0.020 0.439 20.372 -0.153 0.218 0.090
LEHMAN 0.019 -2.040 30.336 -0.226 0.148 0.138
AIG 0.024 1.106 61.673 -0.253 0.402 0.237
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rate is significant in explaining the tails of financial sector market-valued asset returns.
The risk-free interest rate is also a component of the structural model (Merton (1974))
which decreases the likelihood of default as it gets higher. We assume that interest rate
and credit spread reveal a negative relationship, since in a macroeconomic context, a
high level of interest rate is usually found in an economy with high growth where default
rarely occurs. In our research, we consider the three month treasury bill as the risk
free interest rate referring to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). Several fixed-income
factors that capture the time variation in tails of asset returns are further included such
as change in slope of the yield curve, where an increase in the slope of the yield curve
indicates an improvement in economic growth. Another factor is the change in credit
spreads between BAA-rated bonds and treasury rate (both instruments with maturity
of 10 years), which reflects default premium based on market risk. A rise suggests a high
default premium and therefore implies an increase in market risk. In accordance with
Galil et al. (2013) daily equity market returns (CRSP) as determinant of CDS spreads is
also included in addition to daily real estate sector excess return over the market return.
Following the structure model rationale stock returns and stock volatility returns are
components in the spread calculation. Variables such as asset growth, asset volatility
and leverage have a direct impact on credit spreads as the model assumes that they
are the key driving factors for bankcruptcy. As a consequence, we include financial
institution’s individual equity return as a proxy for the change in firm value. A high
equity return increases firm value which leads to reduction in the spread level of the
financial institution. It is also obvious to assume that stock return and credit spread
expose a negative relationship. Refer to Galil et al. (2013) change in leverage is not
statistically significant as a determinant for CDS spread and is therefore excluded from
the set of explanatory variables. However, as change in leverage is highly correlated with
stock return this factor is considered through equity return to a certain extent.
4. Methodology
4.1. Quantile regression
For the calculation of value at risk (VaR), we apply the quantile regression proposed
by Koenker and Bassett (1978), which reveals the relationship between the predictive
variables and a specific quantile of the response variables. By considering the CDS
spreads movements in quantile, we capture the risk and variability of the credit spreads
of the constituents under extreme scenario. Denote Xi as the CDS spread return of
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institution i with i = 1, ..., N , where N is the number of financial institutions (FIs)
considered in our sample. Referring to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), the predicted
quantiles of the CDS spread return is modeled through a linear equation as the following:
Xi,t = αi + γ
>
i Mt−1 + εi,t, (4)
where the vector Mt represents state variables, αi describes the intercept and transposed
vector γ>i outlines the parameters respective to Mt. εi,t is independent in i and t with
τ quantile equal to 0. Again with linear modeling paradigm as equation (4), if we
are interested in the CDS spread returns of Xj , we can form a linear function of state
variables Mt and another CDS spread returns Xi (j 6= i) so that
Xj,t = αj|i + βj|iXi,t + γ
>
j|iMt−1 + εj,t. (5)
Recent findings have questioned the linear relationship between returns of financial
institutions (Chao et al. (2014)). Since the linearity relation between institutions’ CDS
spread returns is not evident nor justified by any economic theory, a partial linear model
has been chosen to model the relationship between the input and output variables.
Figure 4 demonstrates the non-linearity between the CDS spreads returns especially in
extreme events from different institutions as the linear function is not lying within the
confidence bands of the nonparametric curve, which is constructed in Song et al. (2012).
PLM approach has the virtue of allowing more flexibility in the model while avoiding
the curse of dimensionality. Given scalar response variable Xj,t and explanatory scalar
variable Xi,t and state variables vector Mt, the PLM is defined as
Xj,t = f(Xi,t) + β
>Mt + εj,t (6)
where f is an unknown nonparametric function to be estimated, and β> is a transposed
coefficient vector. A detailed explanation about the estimation procedure can be found
in Song et al. (2012). The idea behind the fitting procedure is first finding a reasonable
estimate of β̂ for β, and then regressing the residual Xj,t−β>Mt on Xi,t via local linear
quantile smoothing (Detailed algorithm description is explained in the PLM appendix).
Following by the parameter estimation, the VaR of institution i and the CoVaR of j
conditional on the V aR event of institution i are given by
V̂ aRi,t = α̂i + γ̂
>
i Mt−1, (7)





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Quantile regression at 0.01 level on CDS spread return. The blue line shows the
partial linear quantile regression function. The four dashed lines express the asymptotic
(magenta) and bootstrap (red) confidence bands at 95% confidence level.
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This construction follows from Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). The algorithm to
estimate f̂j|i
(
·) is proposed by Song et al. (2012), and is described in detail in the
appendix.
4.2. Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator for Quantile Re-
gression
Since Chao et al. (2014) show unsatisfactory backtesting results regarding VaR val-
ues, we apply a different way to compute the individual VaR in our paper. First, we
apply the linear Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) technique
in order to find variables with significant effect on CDS spread returns. The LASSO
variable selection method has been introduced by Tibshirani (1996). It is widely known
that LASSO outperforms ridge regression in terms of shrinkage effect. For the typical
case described by Tibshirani (1996), the loss function for LASSO can be viewed as con-
strained versions of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression loss function, which can
also be presented in the Lagrange form as
Llasso(β1, ..., βp) = ‖Y −Xβ‖22, s.t.‖β‖`1 ≤ t1,
where Y ∈ Rn the dependent variable, X ∈ Rnp the independent variable and β ∈ Rp
denotes the coefficients. The LASSO penalty can also be applied to quantile regression












where ρτ (u) = {τ − 1(u ≤ 0)}u and 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 is a given constant.
In our empirical analysis, we use 37 variables for Xi, as mentioned in Section 3.2.
In the section of empirical findings, we will see that the coefficients associated to many
of the independent variable are shrunk to zero as the result of LASSO. To choose the
penalty parameter λn, we apply the generalized approximate cross-validation (GACV)
of Yuan (2006) and Li et al. (2007).
4.3. Backtesting
For check of accuracy of the out-of-sample VaR estimation we compare the actual
CDS spread returns to the calculated VaR (model VaR). Following Christoffersen (1998),
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the hit sequence is defined as
It(τ) =
{




The probability of getting x exceedance from T observations is therefore






where π is the probability of an exceedance for a given confidence level. As the VaR is
calculated under a 1%-quantile, this leads to an expectation of one exceedance every 100
days. The unconditional coverage test introduced by Kupiec(Kupiec (1995)) explores
the frequency of the violations over specific time interval (proportion of failure (POF)).
The null hypothesis for the Kupiec test is represented by




The test statistic is calculated as















In case the value of the test statistic LRPOF exceeds the critical value of the χ
2 distri-
bution with onedegree of freedom, the null hypothesis is to be rejected and the model
is considered as inaccurate. We expect the VaR to be in line with the confidence level.
A failure of the unconditional coverage leads to the conclusion that the VaR does not
measure the risk accurately.
However, it is not only important to test the sequence of exceedance but also look at
the clustering of violations. The conditional coverage test suggested by Christoffersen
(Christoffersen (1998)) includes a seperate statistic for the detection of exceedance’s
independence. We assume that the calculated value accurately reflects the change in
market condition when the exceedance is independent from the previous state. This
means no effect on current exceedance whether there was a violation the day before,
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It−1 = 1, or no violation has occured, It−1 = 0. Let Tij be the total number of event
(It−1, It) = (j, i) in the data for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Denote the probability of observing a





The unconditional probability for violation is
π =
T01 + T11
T00 + T01 + T10 + T11
.
The test statistic of independence is denoted by
LRind = 2 log
(
(1− π)(T00+T10)π(T01+T11)





Under the hypothesis that the method for VaR estimation is accurate, the sequence of
violations should statisfy the unconditional coverage property as well as the independence
property. Therefore, as suggested in Christoffersen (1998), we consider the ”conditional
coverage” test statistic:
LRCC = LRPOF + LRind
exceeds the critical value given by χ2 distribution with two degrees of freedom. The
rejection of the test indicates an inaccurate coverage, clustered violations or both.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Variables that drive the tails
Our regression analysis confirms the relationship between the tail of CDS spread
return and the market volatility, approximated by VIX returns. Interestingly, the effect
of firm specific volatility is not as strong as volatility of the market indicated by the
VIX index. By LASSO, we observe from Tables 10 and 11 that the CDS spread return
is almost described by the VIX log-returns, S&P500 log-returns and the change in daily
real estate sector return in excess to the market return, in which VIX plays the dominant
role.
It is surprising to see that the firm specific variables are so underselected. For some
CDS spreads, such as Citi in pre-crisis period, and CITI, DB, GS, JPM, MS and UBS in
crisis period, firm specific variables are not selected at all. To check for the important role
16
that VIX return plays in modeling the tail of CDS spread returns, we redo the LASSO
without VIX log-return. we find that it is impossible to arrive with a parsimoneous
model, because all variables are selected with nonzero frequency for both pre- and crisis
periods in Table 12 and 13. In both tables, V2 which describes the short term liquidity
spread becomes the most popular choice. In particular, firm specific variables are selected
more often than in crisis period than in pre-crisis period.
The time series of VaR computed from LASSO 37-factor model and AB 7-factor
model show different behavior, as can be seen in Figures 5 and 6. We only present the
pre-crisis time series plots because we want to visualize which model performs better
in capturing the upcoming shock induced by the default of Lehman Brothers in the
September of 2008. The VaR time series plots for the period after the default of Lehman
Brothers behave similar to white noice and do not demonstrate much structure. It is
generally observed that the trajectory of LASSO VaR varies less violently than its coun-
terpart using 7-factor model, while it still accurately captures the risk as the violations
are rather few. It is considered as a benefit because this suggests that with our VaR
model, the financial practitioners do not have to adjust their capitals frequently, and
therefore the transaction cost and be reduced.
Table 3 and 4 show the p-values using the conditional coverage test, which allows
a joint test of unconditional coverage rate and independence. Table 3 shows the pre-
crisis backtesting results. Both AB 7 factor model and our LASSO QR model generate
independent hit sequence, as the independence test statistics are 0 for our data set.
However, we found that the AB 7 factor model performs significantly worse than LASSO
QR model in terms of unconditional coverage. AB’s model leads to too many downside
exceedances and therefore does not yield a good risk measure. Same phenomenon can
be observed for crisis period data as shown in Table 4.
5.2. Network of Risk
As almost all the LASSO VaRs pass the backtesting test, we proceed to use the VaR
prediction to compute CoVaR by the construction in the equation (8).
CoVaR demonstrate different dynamics than VaR. Table 6 and 7 present the ex-
ceedances for two periods: 2005-2007 and 2009-2011. In 2008-2009 periods there are
no CoVaR exceedances, because all financial firms in the sample have large VaR and
the CoVaR computed based on the VaR is also very large. This suggests that CoVaR
dynamics heavily depends on the company conditioned on. Tabel 6 shows that CoVaR
value conditioning on different firms differ trmendously. From the aspect of the sum of
total exceedance, conditioning on firms such as BOA and MS leads to few exceedances,
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while conditioning on firms such as SG, UBS, CS, AIG leads to many exceedances.
The exceedance time series of CoVaR shown in Figure 7 demonstrate strong clustering
phenomenon. In the pairs of AIG on JPM, AIG on MS and Citi on BOA, the exceedances
accumulate in certain periods. In the crisis period, few exceedances are observed, but
the CoVaR seems to over-estimate the risk in the sense that the estimated CoVaRs are
far below the realizations of returns.
The idea of ∆CoVaR calibration on credit risk and intergration of state variables as
well as firm-specific variables have been applied on the model suggested by Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2011). Our results show that the 4CoVaR results from the period until
Lehman’s default reveals different effects on financial institutions from different regions.
As shown in Table 9, for the US financial institutions, the 4CoVaR effect is high when
the distressed counterparty is a US financial institution. The same can be observed
for European based financial institutions. This shows that the 4CoVaR captures the
spillover effect owing to the geological closeness, as we would expect.
Given the VaR obtained from the last section based on 37 variables for pre-crisis
period and crisis period, we are able to compute the CoV aR with (8) using partial
linear model at levels τ = 1% and 50%. The ∆CoV aR can therefore be obtained by the
difference of the two CoVaRs.
The mean and the maximum of the estimated ∆CoV aRs are summarized in Table 8
for pre-crisis period and Table 9. Comparing the two tables, the CoVaRs of crisis period
are in general greater than that of the pre-crisis period in terms of absolute value. In
pre-crisis period, among the 15 financial institutions, BoA, Barc, RBS and JPM are the
ones which introduce the most risk to the market, while AIG and HSBC contribute the
fewest. RBS’s high risk contribution reflects its risk seeking business model before the
crisis. AIG’s low risk contribution may be due to its nature as an insurance company,
but ∆CoVaR seems to underestimate AIG’s potential impact to the market due to its
gigantic CDS position before the crisis. However, it is interesting to note that after LEH
defaults, SG, DB and GS become largest risk contributors, while AIG, Citi, Barc and
MS contribute the fewest. Among the smallest risk contributors in the crisis period, the
first ones are the ones which suffer the greatest hit of the crisis, while MS shifted its
business orientation to a more conservative ground after the crisis.
In order to visualize the risk contribution defined by ∆CoVaR, we make the network
plots. We focus on the data in 3 periods: 2005-2007 (first pre-crisis period), 2007-
2008 (eve of crisis) and 2008-2011 (crisis), as shown in Figures 8, 9 and 10. In these
figures, the nodes represent the financial institutions, the edges represent the amount
of risk contribution and the arrows show the direction of risk contribution. The thicker
18
the edge, the larger the ∆CoVaR in absolute value and therefore the larger the risk
contribution.
It can be seen in Figure 8 for the period 2005-2007 that several financial institutions
are connected through risk contribution. RBS contributes much risk to BARC, which
could be due to their geographic closeness; moreover it is obvious that RBS also con-
tribute risk to HSBC, SG and CS. JPM and LEH contribute much risk to AIG, while
AIG seemingly conveys not too much risk to the others, except BOA. BOA transmits
much risk to CITI and GS.
For the period 2007-2008, the relationship between these firms varies. The risk
contribution to AIG becomes prominent. RBS still contribute risk to BARC and SG,
but the contribution to HSBC becomes less obvious. BOA still conveys much risk to
CITI. At this moment, although the international financial market looks interconnected,
but regional effect actually plays a big role.
We then proceed to the last network figure for crisis periof depicted in Figure 10.
The boundaries of region crash and firms from different regions can contribute significant
risk to each other, while the firms in the same region remain very much connected. SG
contribute much risk to JPM, BOA and GS. It is also interesting to note that the direction
of risk contribution can also change. BOA contributes risk to CITI in pre-crisis period,
but in crisis it is the other way around. SG is mainly a risk receiver before the crisis, but
it changes its role to a risk contributor for this period. This could result from European
debt crisis in 2011, during which the fear of bankrupcy for SG drives its CDS spread
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Figure 5: First part: The plots VaR from LASSO 37 factors model and AB 7 factor
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(n) AIG-AB7
Figure 6: Second part: The plots VaR from LASSO 37 factors model and AB 7 factor
model in pre-crisis period Sep. 2002-Sep. 2008.
6. Conclusion
Best overall performance for VaR estimation is achieved via LASSO quantile regres-
sion while considering 37 independent variables and under the variable selection method
LASSO (following notified as LASSO-37-VaR) which is confirmed by backstesting re-
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sults. The calculated VaR also shows a good performance during the crisis period and
is able cover certain extreme CDS spreads drops. However, these VaR overestimate the
risk during the crisis period whereas VaR simulated via standard quantile regression by
using 7 state variables suggested by (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011) shows a lower
VaR level. On the other hand, LASSO-37-VaR show a more accurate and stable VaR es-
timation during the pre-crisis and crisis period. VaR simulated under the assumptionof
Adrian and Brunnermeier tends to over-estimate CDS spread returns in calm period.
Based on our findings, the calculated4CoVaR can be used as a basis for risk weights
which described the change between normal circumstances and a stressed VaR. As a
consequence, risk contribution can be charged based on idiosyncratic risk and further on
the spillover effects given by the risk weight. A valuable question of how counterparty
credit risk affects the pricing of CDS contracts could also be investigated based on the
overall effects of one distressed institution on CDS spreads of other market players. In
addition, this approach provides the possibility to measure spread widening effect from
derivative dealer on spread level from reference entities. Effect of extreme CDS spreads





For the PLM estimation, we adopt the algorithm described in Song et al. (2012).
Given data {(Xt, Yt)}Tt=1 bivariate and {Mt}Tt=1 multivariate random variables. The
PLM is:
Yt = f(Xt) + β
>Mt + εt.
Suppose the support of Xt is bounded in [0, 1] for simplicity. Let an denote an
increasing sequence of positive integers and set bn = a
−1
n . For each n = 1, 2, ..., dividing
the interval [0, 1] into an subintervals Ii, i = 1, ..., an with equal length bn. On each Ii,
f(·) can approximately be taken as a constant.
The PLM estimation procedure is:
1. Inside each partition Ii, a linear quantile regression is performed to get β̂i, then
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Figure 10: 4CoVaR network: average 4CoVaR between FIs within the crisis period.
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Table 3: Backtesting results for LASSO-QR VaR and AB’s 7 factor model for data in
pre-crisis periods.
LASSO-QR VaR AB 7 Factor
Fin. Firms LRPOF LRcond p-value LRPOF LRcond p-value
CITI 3.22 0 0.20 38.69 0 < 0.001***
BOA 5.27 0 0.07 41.17 0 < 0.001***
BARC 1.01 0 0.60 17.22 0 < 0.001***
BNP 4.19 0 0.12 27.17 0 < 0.001***
CS 1.01 0 0.60 59.9 0 < 0.001***
DB 7.73 0 0.02* 62.76 0 < 0.001***
GS 13.73 0 0.001** 57.08 0 < 0.001***
HSBC 3.22 0 0.20 46.27 0 < 0.001***
JPM 4.19 0 0.12 93.73 0 < 0.001***
MS 5.27 0 0.07 103.77 0 < 0.001***
RBS 3.22 0 0.20 43.7 0 < 0.001***
SG 6.45 0 0.04* 22.99 0 < 0.001***
UBS 1.62 0 0.44 33.91 0 < 0.001***
LEH 27.17 0 < 0.001*** 51.58 0 < 0.001***
AIG 12.11 0 0.002** 93.73 0 < 0.001***
Table 4: Backtesting results for LASSO-QR VaR and AB’s 7 factor model for data in
crisis periods.
LASSO-QR VaR AB 7 Factor
Fin. Firms LRPOF LR p-value LRPOF LRcond p-value
CITI 1.75 0 0.42 30.67 0 < 0.001***
BOA 0.07 0 0.97 10.88 0 < 0.001***
BARC 8.95 0 0.01* 33.6 0 < 0.001***
BNP 10.88 0 0.004** 39.72 0 < 0.001***
CS 1.75 0 0.42 25.09 0 < 0.001***
DB 0.91 0 0.63 42.9 0 < 0.001***
GS 5.54 0 0.06 17.47 0 < 0.001***
HSBC 2.81 0 0.24 19.9 0 < 0.001***
JPM 0.27 0 0.97 8.95 0 < 0.001***
MS 8.95 0 0.01* 25.09 0 < 0.001***
RBS 0.32 0 0.85 17.47 0 < 0.001***
SG 4.09 0 0.13 63.54 0 < 0.001***
UBS 17.47 0 < 0.001*** 17.47 0 < 0.001***
AIG 0.07 0 0.97 36.62 0 < 0.001***
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Table 5: The variables used for predicting VaR
Index Variable
V1 VIX
V2 Short term liquidity spread
V3 3 months Treasury Bill rate
V4 Slope of the yield curve
V5 Credit spread between 10 years BAA-rated bonds and Treasury Bond rate
V6 S&P500 index log-return
V7 Dow Jones US Real Estate Index
V8 CITIGROUP equity
V9 BANK of AMERICA equity
V10 BARCLAYS equity
V11 BNP PARIBAS equity




V16 JP MORGAN equity
V17 MORGAN STANLEY equity
V18 ROYAL BANK of SCOTLAND equity
V19 SOCIETE GENERALE equity
V20 UBS equity
V21 LEHMAN BROTHERS equity
V22 AIG equity
V23 CITIGROUP equity volatility
V24 BANK of AMERICA equity volatility
V25 BARCLAYS equity volatility
V26 BNP PARIBAS equity volatility




V31 JP MORGAN equity volatility
V32 MORGAN STANLEY equity volatility
V33 ROYAL BANK of SCOTLAND equity volatility
V34 SOCIETE GENERALE equity volatility
V35 UBS equity volatility
V36 LEHMAN BROTHERS equity volatility
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